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The  aim of  this  research  was  to  explore  and  synthesise  learning  from  stakeholders  (NHS
dentists, commissioners  and patients)  approximately  five  years  on from  the  introduction
of  a new  NHS  dental  contract  in England.  The  case  study  involved  a purposive  sample  of
stakeholders  associated  with  a former  NHS Primary  Care Trust  (PCT)  in  the  north  of England.
Semi-structured  interviews  were  conducted  with  8 commissioners  of  NHS  dental  services
and 5 NHS  general  dental  practitioners.  Three  focus  group  meetings  were  held  with  14 NHS
dental  patients.  All focus  groups  and  interviews  were  audio  recorded  and  transcribed  ver-
batim.  The  data  were  analysed  using  a  framework  approach.  Four  themes  were identified:
‘commissioners’  views  of  managing  local  NHS  dental  services’;  ‘the  risks  of  commission-
ing  for  patient  access’;  ‘costs,  contract  currency  and  commissioning  constraints’;  and  ‘local
decision-making  and  future  priorities’.  Commissioners  reported  that  much  of  their time
was  spent managing  existing  contracts  rather than  commissioning  services.  Patients  were
unclear  about  the  NHS  dental  charge  bands  and  dentists  strongly  criticised  the  contract’s
target-driven  approach  which  was  centred  upon  them  generating  ‘units  of  dental  activity’.
NHS  commissioners  remained  relatively  constrained  in  their  abilities  to reallocate  dental
resources  amongst  contracts.  The  national  focus  upon  practitioners  achieving  their  units  of
dental  activity  appeared  to outweigh  interest  in  the  quality  of  dental  care  provided.
© 2015  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd. This  is  an  open  access  article  under
Y-NC-Nthe  CC  B
. Introduction
In April 2006, primary care National Health Service
NHS) dental services in England and Wales began operat-Please cite this article in press as: Holmes RD, et al. Learning from
study of stakeholders in the north of England. Health Policy (20
ng under a ‘new’ general dental services (nGDS) contract.
undamentally, three major changes impacted upon NHS
ental services at this time. First, financial resources for
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168-8510/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. This is an open
rg/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).D  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
NHS dentistry became overtly ‘cash limited’ [1] when
resources were devolved to Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) in
England and Local Health Boards (LHBs) in Wales from
the national budget. The devolution of resources and
decision-making responsibilities to PCTs and LHBs marked
the beginning of local dental commissioning which in
turn opened potential opportunities for the local priori-
tisation of resources [2]. Commissioning is the term used
to describe a ‘proactive strategic role in planning, design- contract change in primary care dentistry: A qualitative
15), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2015.02.012
ing and implementing the range of services required’ [3].
Although this activity was only introduced to NHS pri-
mary care dental services in 2006, NHS commissioning
in the whole of the UK began in the early 1990s when
 access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.
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the purchaser/provider split was introduced as part of
the quasi-internal market. Despite devolution leading to
a divergence in the structures of the NHS and social care
systems across the four nations of the UK, and a greater
resultant focus in each country on more local issues, the
term ‘commissioning’ is still used UK-wide. Consequently,
the effectiveness of commissioning, the impact of wider
NHS reforms and the performance of the NHS across all
four UK countries since devolution continue to be the sub-
ject of much research, analysis and cross-border learning
[4–7].
The second change affecting primary care NHS dental
services in England and Wales in 2006 was the introduc-
tion of a new contract currency, the ‘unit of dental activity’
(UDA). UDAs are the unit of currency for measuring the
type of clinical activity performed by dentists within a
12-month contract for an agreed financial value [8]. The
financial value of a UDA varies between dental practition-
ers as a consequence of a decision to use a 12-month ‘test’
period during 2004–2005 as the basis for calculating den-
tists’ annual salaries. Differences in the volume and type
of dental treatment activity conducted during this refer-
ence period have resulted in the financial value of one UDA
typically ranging between £17 and £40 [8]. The UDA has
attracted much criticism from dental practitioners who  cite
inequity regarding variable UDA rates and a target-focused
mentality which has often resulted in anxiety resulting
from the financial implications associated with contract
underperformance [9,10].
The third significant change impacting upon NHS pri-
mary care dental services in England and Wales was  the
introduction of a new patient charge system which reduced
over four hundred different NHS dental charges to just
three broad charge bands. The ‘NHS Dentistry: Patient
Charges Working Group’ who developed these charge
bands involved both patient groups and representatives
of the dental profession [11]. There was a desire to sim-
plify patient charging and uncouple the direct link between
dentists’ remuneration and individual items of treatment
activity. However, neither the patient charge bands nor the
UDA system were piloted prior to their implementation in
April 2006.
In 2008 the House of Commons Health Committee pub-
lished a highly detailed report on NHS dental services. The
Committee found that in-house commissioning skills var-
ied greatly between PCTs and that too many PCTs were
‘not doing a good job’ [12]. The Government responded
by acknowledging the variable quality of dental commis-
sioning between PCTs, alongside other aspects linked to the
nGDS contract [13].
In response to this report, an independent review of
NHS dental services was commenced, and then published
in June 2009. The report called for dental contracts to be
developed with clearer incentives for improving health,
access and the quality of dental treatment [14]. A ‘staged
pathway through care’ was suggested by the authors of
the review as a means of encouraging continuity of carePlease cite this article in press as: Holmes RD, et al. Learning from
study of stakeholders in the north of England. Health Policy (20
between patients and dentists. Additionally, the review
team reported ‘. . .there is some very good commissioning
taking place but it is by no means universal’ [15]. Evidence
gathered since 2006 has indicated that measures used in PRESS
cy xxx (2015) xxx–xxx
the nGDS contract have concentrated upon quantity not
quality [16]. From a resource allocation perspective, sev-
eral studies have also noted that the focus for some NHS
organisations has been upon day-to-day management of
existing contracts rather than the true commissioning of
dental services [17,18].
Since this study was  undertaken, the former 152 PCTs
across England have been abolished and NHS dentistry
is now commissioned by one organisation—NHS England
(NHSE) with a regional structure. These developments will
be considered later in light of the results from this study.
However, whilst the organisational structure of dental
commissioning has now changed across England, the same
principles of commissioning apply.
Following introduction of the 2006 nGDS contract, the
parliamentary inquiry [19], the independent review of NHS
dental services [14] and three years of piloting, there is
now the prospect of a ‘reformed’ dental contract. The aim
of this paper is to synthesise the learning from stakehol-
ders directly involved, and explore the impact of the 2006
nGDS contract to inform the new plans for reform.
2. Method
2.1. Setting
The study was conducted in a large NHS commissioning
organisation (combining 2 neighbouring PCTs) in the north
of England.
2.2. Design and sample
To explore the impact of the 2006 nGDS contract upon
key stakeholders, a qualitative case-study design was cho-
sen as there have been calls for case-studies to provide
the much needed exemplars to support social science [20].
Case study approaches can also facilitate the study of more
complex and integrated systems such as health care orga-
nisations [21].
The study involved three stakeholder groups: patients;
primary care dental practitioners and NHS commission-
ers. Semi-structured interviews and focus groups elicited
the opinions of participants about the nGDS contract and
local NHS dental services. Semi-structured interviews were
conducted with 8 of the 9 PCT staff members who held
responsibility for commissioning local NHS dental services.
One senior PCT staff member declined to participate citing
pressure of work.
Two  local public engagement groups were contacted
to represent NHS patients and service-users. Local NHS
dental practitioners were identified with the assistance
of the PCT’s dental practice advisor (DPA). A purposive
sampling strategy was used to identify: dentists with vary-
ing levels of NHS experience; a combination of principal
dentists (providers), associate dentists (performers) and a
dental practice owned by a large corporate body. PCT staff contract change in primary care dentistry: A qualitative
15), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2015.02.012
members were contacted by one member of the research
team (RH). Potential participants received a letter about
the study together with a detailed information sheet and
consent form.
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In total, 27 participants were recruited to the study: 14
ocal NHS dental patients, 8 local dental commissioners and
 local NHS general dental practitioners.
.3. Data collection
One member of the research team (RH) conducted all
f the semi-structured interviews and focus groups. The
nterviews with NHS general dental practitioners took
lace in their dental practices. For NHS commissioners,
nterviews took place at the PCT headquarters. The focus
roups with patients were held in neutral venues. A pre-
iloted topic guide was used to prompt the interviewer
nd this was modified during the data collection process.
ocus groups and semi-structured interviews were audio-
ecorded and professionally transcribed verbatim.
.4. Data analysis
Each transcript was reviewed against the original audio-
ecording to ensure that the conversion of speech to text
ad been prepared accurately [22]. Three members of the
esearch team then independently familiarised themselves
ith the transcripts in order to build a provisional overview
f the emerging issues as proposed by Framework analysis
23]. The data contained in the transcripts were then coded
ine by line before being entered into a spreadsheet matrix
o assist in the identification of themes. Data were ana-
ysed manually. Finally, the research team met  on several
ccasions to agree the thematic framework.
.5. Research ethics
The study received a favourable ethical opinion
Research Ethics Committee Reference: 10/H0908/9) and
esearch governance approval was granted by the NHS
ommissioning organisation involved. To protect partici-
ants’ anonymity, these organisations and the gender of the
takeholders involved have been removed from quotations
ithin the Results section.
. Results
Four themes emerged from the data: (1) commission-
rs’ views of managing local NHS dental services; (2) the
isks of commissioning for patient access; (3) costs, con-
ract currency and commissioning constraints, and (4) local
ecision-making and future priorities. Verbatim quotations
re used as examples to provide context to the issues raised
y participants.
.1. Theme 1: Commissioners’ views of managing local
HS dental services
Dental contract management was driven by local com-
issioners who monitored practitioners’ ability to achievePlease cite this article in press as: Holmes RD, et al. Learning from
study of stakeholders in the north of England. Health Policy (20
DAs in compliance with national nGDS regulations and
heir annual contract values. This target-based approach
ppeared to dominate at the expense of other potential
erformance indicators. PRESS
y xxx (2015) xxx–xxx 3
Commissioners are focused very much on the number of
patients seen by a dentist, regardless of quality.  . .you’re
commissioning on units of dental activity and on the num-
ber of patients, not on quality or outcomes or prevention.
(ID6, commissioner)
Five years on from the introduction of local dental
commissioning, dental contract management (rather than
the true commissioning of dental services) continued to
dominate the workload of staff.
There needs to be a fundamental shift from administer-
ing contracts to commissioning them. . .there needs to be
more robust commissioning of dental services. (ID7, com-
missioner)
Nationally, there continues to be a concerted effort by
the Department of Health to continually increase patient
access to NHS dentistry. Consequently, for commissioners,
their focus appeared to revolve around achieving quantita-
tive access targets.
A lot of the problem has been. . .the focus on [patient]
access and people have taken away from that various
messages. . .some of those messages have been ‘hit the
numbers irrespective of the quality’, in other words it
doesn’t matter who you get in [to dental services], even
if they have no health care needs at all—that’s a figure you
can count. (ID7, commissioner)
However, in the north of England where this study
was based, patient access to dentistry was  arguably not
as severe as the problems experienced in the south of
the country. This led to a sense of frustration for some
commissioners, who found the unrelenting national focus
upon improving patient access at odds with the needs and
demands of the local population. In other words the central
demands were not aligned with local needs.
3.2. Theme 2: The risks of commissioning for patient
access
Access to NHS dental treatment was  a significant con-
cern for the patients recruited to this study. However,
participants’ concerns focused around having to travel rel-
atively long distances to access NHS dental practices as a
consequence of the large geographic area.
To get people from [location] to go to the dentist is
a nightmare because they tend to only go when the
tooth is absolutely killing them; they don’t do regular
appointments.  . .you’ve got to get two buses at least. . .you
don’t bother.  . .you’ve got to go further afield and people
are terribly parochial. (P4, NHS patient)
However, in contrast to the quotation above, a new
NHS dental practice had been commissioned locally but the
service ultimately failed, due largely to a low level of patient
utilisation. At a separate interview, a local NHS dental prac- contract change in primary care dentistry: A qualitative
15), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2015.02.012
titioner wished to discuss this specific example.
I know the PCT have thrown a lot of money at the rural
surgeries. I think they had to close one in [location] because
they just didn’t have enough patients there. . .whereas they
 ING Model
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would have been a lot better off having given that money to
the city centre. People from outside the city can easily get a
bus here and they’re coming anyhow to do their shopping.
It’s not necessary to put all that money out in the sticks
for a service which isn’t going to be used. (ID2, Principal
dentist)
This example perhaps highlights issues associated with
patients’ propensity to seek dental treatment. However, it
is acknowledged that the use of resources by commission-
ers in this case was undoubtedly well intentioned and the
issues at play may  well have been more complex than those
suggested above.
3.3. Theme 3. Costs, contract currency and
commissioning constraints
This theme consists of three sub-themes: (3.1) patient
charges; (3.2) contract currency (units of dental activity)
and (3.3) factors impacting upon business.
3.3.1. Patient charges
The patient charges associated with the three treatment
bands encompassed by the 2006 nGDS contract were a
major source of confusion for patients in this study. None of
the patients recruited were able to describe the NHS den-
tal charge band structure. Of concern, were the number of
comments received about ‘additional fees’ added to finan-
cial estimates that were not recognised by the authors as
NHS charges relating to Band 1, 2 or 3 treatments.
There always seems to be something sort of added on [to
the bill], like an x-ray, a scale. . .extras. (P2, NHS patient)
. . .then there’s the hygienist but they’re expensive, you’re
in maybe 15 minand they charge you 30 something
pounds”. (M3, NHS patient)
The confusion about NHS patient charges may  not have
been helped by some practitioners’ choice of terminology
with patients.
.  . .the company is keen to offer patients upgrades. We
don’t. . .necessarily call it private treatment. We  call it
‘offering them upgrades’. (ID2, Principal dentist, body cor-
porate)
3.3.2. Contract currency (units of dental activity)
Commissioners acknowledged that because the finan-
cial value of UDAs varied significantly across local
practitioners’ contracts, this was often a significant cause of
anger for many dentists. Consequently, UDA values fuelled
a perception of inequity amongst practitioners.
A UDA value isn’t the same or anywhere near perhaps what
another dentist would be paid as a UDA value. So, some
might be on £18, some might be on near enough £40 a
UDA in our PCT. (ID9, commissioner)
One practitioner on a low financial UDA rate explainedPlease cite this article in press as: Holmes RD, et al. Learning from
study of stakeholders in the north of England. Health Policy (20
how this had impacted upon their clinical practise, as
patients with high treatment needs and requiring more
complex restorative dental care must all be paid for within
a single Band 3 patient charge. PRESS
cy xxx (2015) xxx–xxx
I’m seeing a lot of new patients. . .they need crowns,
bridges, dentures. . .I  can’t do anymore this month because
my laboratory fees are shooting through the roof. . .my  last
lab bill was £1,700 for the month.  . .I  can’t afford to do that
because that’s coming out of my wages. (ID1, dentist)
The UDA-based system reportedly caused varying
degrees of stress and anxiety for many NHS general dental
practitioners. This quote is from a body corporate employee
where the wider company applied pressure to practitioners
around achieving their contractual UDA targets.
The biggest concern is the UDAs because obviously the com-
pany look at targets and hitting target. It we’re not hitting
target then we’re deemed to be failing. It puts pressure on
the dentists. (ID2, Principal dentist, body corporate)
3.3.3. Impacts upon managing local dental services
Commissioners generally reported that they felt sig-
nificantly constrained in their abilities to manage local
NHS dental services. It was  reported that almost all of the
PCT resource available to fund NHS primary care dentistry
had already been allocated to individual practitioners’ con-
tracts as a consequence of the decision to remunerate NHS
dentists on their activity during the defined ‘test’ period.
So, in reality, opportunities for commissioners to reallo-
cate significant financial resource from one contract to
another, or to commission new dental services, were rel-
atively limited. Resource reallocation opportunities only
arose where there were significant contract breaches (e.g.
underperformance), when practitioners relinquished their
NHS contracts or when practitioners agreed to permanent
rebasing of their contracts. The following quotations from
commissioners provide evidence to support these asser-
tions.
Most resource is tied up, 90% plus is already tied up. (ID7,
commissioner)
The budget is really tight. The only way we are going to
get money is through rebasing contracts where people
are underperforming. . .so we’re finding out we’ve got our
hands tied really. (ID10, commissioner)
Although commissioners sought financial ‘claw-back’
from practitioners who significantly underperformed on
their contracts, this in itself caused potential problems. The
resource released in these scenarios was typically ‘non-
recurrent’ and available for use only in the short-term. This
reportedly led to perverse financial situations.
We have too much non-recurrent money–we can’t spend
it in a sensible manner because if you say to a practice
‘have some money for a year’ what can they do? They can’t
employ staff. . .they can’t give a dentist a robust contract.
(ID6, commissioner)
The process by which the commissioning organisation
allocated ‘unspent’ UDAs as a consequence of dentists’ con-
tractual underperformance, was unclear to the research contract change in primary care dentistry: A qualitative
15), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2015.02.012
team as well as local dental practitioners. Unspent UDAs
are important marginal resource and they offer flex-
ibility around commissioning. Commissioners reported
that ‘internal deliberation’ drove decision-making about
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nspent UDAs. However, general dental practitioners
elieved there was room for greater transparency.
You always wonder about the transparency of UDA allo-
cation. How does it work?.  . .How’s the commissioning all
gone about?. . .(ID2, Principal dentist, body corporate)
.4. Theme 4. Local decision-making and future priorities
This theme concentrated upon engagement between
HS dentists and commissioners (4.1), the decision-
aking processes involving commissioners with respect to
esource allocation (4.2) and suggested future priorities for
ocal dental services moving forward into the future (4.3).
.4.1. Engagement between dentists and commissioners
Local dentists acknowledged that the balance of power
as held by their local commissioning organisation.
It’s like what they say, goes. You have no negotia-
tion. Everyone is scared about not reaching their [UDA]
targets. . .I  find that what the PCT wants to do, they’ll do.
(ID1, dentist)
In this study, engagement between the commissioning
rganisation and local dentists was believed to have deteri-
rated since the introduction of local commissioning. This
ad not been helped by the rapid turnover of local commis-
ioners.
I would say it’s got worse for a variety of reasons. . . there’s
been a problem with a lot of changes in staff. . .I think there
were a lot of promises made. When I came into post a lot
of what I got was ‘well I was promised this would happen
- and it never happened’. (ID9, commissioner)
.4.2. The decision-making process by commissioners
The level of detail provided by commissioners with
espect to decision-making about local resource alloca-
ion was disappointing. Only one participant provided a
rief overview describing how decisions were made with
espect to dental commissioning.
If the PCT has extra money, then cases are usually put for-
ward to use that resource. . .based upon an assessment of
need. . .if  you look at the investment programme of the
PCT over a number of years we’ve put services into those
areas with high needs and a lack of services and they’ve
worked. . .to a variable extent. (ID7, commissioner)
The above quotation links to an earlier theme which
xplored the risks of commissioning for patient access and
he complexities associated with locating new NHS dental
ervices to meet patients’ clinical needs. Under-utilisation
f new dental services by patients in some areas had clearly
esulted in variable commissioning success.
.4.3. Future local priorities for NHS dental services
Commissioners were acutely aware of the current lackPlease cite this article in press as: Holmes RD, et al. Learning from
study of stakeholders in the north of England. Health Policy (20
f focus in the nGDS contract upon measuring the quality of
are provided by dentists. Almost without exception, qual-
ty measures were highlighted as an area requiring greater
ocus. PRESS
y xxx (2015) xxx–xxx 5
I want to look at how we can pay dentists to provide a
quality service.  . .access for patients is brilliant, but access
to a poor quality service, what’s the point in that?. (ID13,
dental practice adviser)
All stakeholders involved in this research agreed on the
need for more dental disease prevention activity within the
dental contract. The lack of financial reward for dentists
undertaking prevention was seen to be a major failing of
the current dental contract.
One of the big things that’s been lacking really is preven-
tion, because the prevention in the end will help. . .There’s
no incentive for them [dentists] to do it. Some will do more
than others because that’s what they’re passionate about
and some will say ‘well, I’m not getting paid for it, so I won’t
do it. (ID9, commissioner)
We  need more money spent on preventative
dentistry. . .early treatment is certainly more preven-
tative than later treatment.  . .catching children when
they’re young (F2, NHS patient)
4. Discussion
The three stakeholder groups in our study: patients;
dentists and NHS commissioners, universally criticised the
current dental system approximately five years after intro-
duction of the nGDS contract and local commissioning.
The main issues highlighted by participants will be con-
sidered below, in the context of key recent developments
in national health policy.
Around the time that our data analysis ended, the
Department of Health announced a pilot programme to
reform NHS dentistry by introducing a reformed contract
to reflect the changing oral health needs of the popula-
tion [24]. Since undertaking our research, the dental pilot
programme has provided substantial evidence suggesting
that practitioners and patients strongly support the new
preventive care based pathway approach, at least in the
early stages [25–27]. However, more work is required on
the development of the new dental quality and outcomes
framework (DQOF) and its contribution to practitioners’
remuneration [28]. Recently, the Department of Health has
announced its intention to test prototypes for a possible
new system incorporating a blend of activity, capitation
and quality payments [29]. Despite the need for more test-
ing, the contract reform programme does appear to be
attempting to address many of the areas of criticism raised
by stakeholders in this work, but the stakeholders also
identified areas that are more difficult to address.
Prior to April 2013, 152 PCTs across England com-
missioned dental services in different ways. These
organisations were sometimes criticised for their variable
quality of commissioning [12,30]. With PCTs now abol-
ished, it remains to be seen how effective the new single
commissioning organisation (NHSE) will be, as much of
the day-to-day business of this large organisation is still contract change in primary care dentistry: A qualitative
15), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2015.02.012
managed at local levels through Local Area Teams (LATs)
[31]. It is unclear at the moment, how effective LATs will
be able to be at managing resource scarcity. However, the
units of budgetary allocation should be much larger and
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the existence of one commissioning body should encourage
whole-England strategic planning and greater consistency
[31]. This provides an opportunity for greater flexibility in
commissioning.
Research has highlighted that little is known about how
effective commissioning is actually achieved in practice
[32]. Consequently, it can be useful to draw upon sound
principles and learning from wider health care. For exam-
ple, the effectiveness of future dental commissioning
processes could build upon and be measured against
the ‘principles of commissioning’ published by the Royal
College of General Practitioners (RCGP) [33]. The RCGP
commissioning principles are based upon a collaborative;
community focused; comprehensive and clinically-led
approach to the development of services. Furthermore, The
King’s Fund in its document ‘Transforming our health care
system’ outlines ten priorities for commissioners [34]. Two
of the ten priorities are highly relevant to NHS dentistry as
they are directly linked to implementing evidence-based
disease prevention interventions on which the dental pilot
programme is also focused. Together, both the RCGP and
The King’s Fund identify the need to ensure sustainability
in the commissioning of health care services in response
to ongoing resource constraints and challenging organi-
sational environments. These commissioning principles
apply as much to dental services as they do to the wider
NHS. Finally, set against the backdrop of devolution and
increasing policy divergence across the four countries that
comprise the United Kingdom [7], it will be interesting to
see how the devolved nations view developments relating
to the dental contract reform programme as the prototypes
are tested.
The first theme in our paper relates to commissioners’
views of managing local NHS dental services. Key concerns
for dental commissioners included that their workload was
predominantly focused upon administering existing den-
tal contracts. Similarly, achieving greater patient access
to services was perceived to be a higher priority (at the
national level) than monitoring the quality of care provided
by NHS dental practices even where this did not always
align with local priorities. The proposed DQOF, whereby
dentists’ work is measured alongside the clinical outcomes
they achieve for patients, provides a further opportunity to
change the balance, but as the Department of Health accept,
there is a need to ensure that the right quality and outcome
measures are developed and refined [35].
The second theme focused upon the risks associated
with commissioning for patient access. In comparison to
the former PCTs particularly in the south of England, our
study setting did not suffer from significant patient access
issues because of a lack of local NHS provision or capacity.
Instead, there were significant geographic barriers related
to rurality and the long distances that some patients needed
to travel to access services. The alignment of national
messages and local priorities could remain a tension
unless a balance is found. In addition to measuring ‘qual-
ity’, the two remaining core elements in the dental pilotPlease cite this article in press as: Holmes RD, et al. Learning from
study of stakeholders in the north of England. Health Policy (20
programme include ‘capitation’ (paying dentists related
to the number of patients under their care rather than
the numbers of courses of treatment they provide) and
‘registration’ (encouraging a partnership between patient PRESS
cy xxx (2015) xxx–xxx
and dentist to facilitate health improvement over time)
[24]. Both elements have the potential to promote a
long-term professional relationship between patient and
practitioner.
The third theme relating to costs, contract currency
and commissioning constraints identified significant issues
for all stakeholder groups involved in the study. Patients
reported an overwhelming lack of clarity about the differ-
ent dental charge bands and the financial costs involved.
Dental practitioners criticised local commissioners for a
lack of decision-making transparency relating to the award
of non-recurrent UDAs and commissioners admitted that
their ability to commission local dental services was sig-
nificantly constrained by national nGDS regulations. The
study findings support research which has highlighted
practitioners’ frustrations, resentment and reduced job
satisfaction since the introduction of the nGDS contract
[36,37]. In this study, much negativity centred upon the
use of UDAs as a contract currency, strengthening a percep-
tion that the contract was little more than a target-based
system. Significant variation in the financial value of UDAs
generated considerable resentment and a perception of
inequity amongst practitioners.
The risks and challenges for dental commissioning in
the future are brought into sharp focus by our findings.
First, the financial resources associated with primary care
nGDS services appear to be largely ‘locked’ within existing
contracts based in turn, upon the historic ‘test’ period. For
NHS commissioners, this has proved to be a very challeng-
ing starting point for the equitable commissioning of local
NHS primary care dental services. In April 2006, resources
may  not have been best placed (geographically) to meet
the needs of local populations, and our findings in this case
study suggest that commissioners have generally not been
able to reallocate NHS dental resources on a large scale
because of the nGDS regulations which effectively allow
practitioners to hold their NHS contracts in perpetuity
(subject to satisfactorily meeting their contractual obli-
gations). This is good for the individual small businesses,
allowing stability, but it stifles the abilities of commission-
ers to address other priorities.
With regard to commissioning challenges, there con-
tinues to be significant misalignment between what we
know will benefit patients (for example, the application
of evidence-based disease prevention interventions [38]),
and a lack of financial incentives for practitioners to actu-
ally deliver these interventions within the current contract.
Additionally, the contract currency (the UDA) has resulted
in a perception of inequity amongst practitioners. For those
dentists with a relatively low UDA financial value, there
is explicit evidence from our study that this has impacted
upon their behaviour and clinical practise. Several dentists
were explicit that the financial cost to the dentist of pro-
viding multiple crowns, bridges or dentures within a single
(Band 3) patient charge had made such dental treatment
‘uneconomic’ for practitioners to provide in NHS primary
care. In such cases, dentists clearly expected a more directly contract change in primary care dentistry: A qualitative
15), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2015.02.012
proportional link between cost and payment for each item
of care.
The final theme focused around local decision-making
and priority setting. Future priorities for commissioners
 ING ModelH
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R.D. Holmes et al. / Hea
nd dentists identified a need to focus more upon the qual-
ty of dental care which the pilots are now taking forward.
ll stakeholders recognised the need to make the preven-
ion of dental disease a higher priority. Early findings from
he pilot programme have reported that the management
f disease risk using a care pathway approach makes clin-
cal sense to practitioners and patients have responded
ositively with respect to receiving personalised care plans
rom dentists [25]. However, this can take more time and
herefore resource. If this is a priority there may  need to
e some difficult decisions about what is not such high
riority.
There are some limitations associated with our research.
lthough the study was conducted in a large former NHS
ommissioning organisation, our results may  not have been
eneralisable to other PCTs that existed across the coun-
ry. For example, we have already highlighted that the
tudy setting did not reflect the significant patient access
ssues reported elsewhere and particularly in the south
f England. However, our research does support many
f the views identified by others since the introduction
f the nGDS contract. Indeed, one of the key findings of
his study is that over five years on, many of the same
ontractual issues persist. There are a number of similari-
ies between participants’ views in this case-study and an
arlier qualitative dental research study conducted across
en former PCTs in England [18]. Research is also explor-
ng the organisation and delivery of primary dental care
y comprehensively evaluating a blended contract model
ompared to the existing nGDS contracts in one area of the
nited Kingdom [39]. One of the strengths of this study
longside the research findings we have presented is to
rovide insight into the process of contractual change for
he stakeholders involved, prior to the implementation of
 reformed national dental contract.
. Conclusion
This study marks five years on from the introduction
f the 2006 nGDS contract in England, yet commissioners
ontinued to report significant constraints in their abilities
o reallocate resources between practitioners’ contracts,
argely as a consequence of historic funding decisions and
GDS regulations. General dental practitioners’ contracts
esemble budget silos which are not generally amenable
o large-scale resource reallocation at local levels in the
bsence of significant underperformance or more serious
ontractual breaches.
The national dental contract reform programme has the
otential to address some of the concerns expressed by
articipants in this study. However it is unclear how NHS
tructural reforms introduced since this study was  con-
ucted, will address potential tensions between a national
ommissioning approach for NHS dental services and the
exibility required by local commissioners. Similarly, at
ocal levels there needs to be a concerted move away from
ocusing upon the day-to-day administration of existingPlease cite this article in press as: Holmes RD, et al. Learning from
study of stakeholders in the north of England. Health Policy (20
HS dental contracts towards the more robust commis-
ioning of NHS dental services by NHS England’s Local Area
eams. Despite these concerns, the national dental pilot
rogramme may  provide a long overdue opportunity to
[ PRESS
y xxx (2015) xxx–xxx 7
improve NHS primary care dental services for the benefit
of patients, dental professionals and ultimately, tax payers.
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